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Abstract Games are considered in which the role of the players is a hierarchical one.
Some players behave as leaders, others as followers. Such games are named after
Stackelberg. In the current paper, a special type of these games is considered, known
in the literature as inverse Stackelberg games. In such games, the leader (or: leaders)
announces his strategy as a mapping from the follower (or: followers) decision space
into his own decision space. Arguments for studying such problems are given. The
routine way of analysis, leading to a study of composed functions, is not very fruitful.
Other approaches are given, mainly by studying specific examples. Phenomena in
problems with more than one leader and/or follower are studied within the context of
the inverse Stackelberg concept. As a side issue, expressions like “two captains on a
ship” and “divide and conquer” are given a mathematical foundation.
Keywords Games · Transaction costs · Stackelberg games · Inverse Stackelberg
games · Composed functions
1 Introduction: Stackelberg Equilibria and Terminology
This paper deals with various types of Stackelberg problems, with a clear emphasis
on inverse Stackelberg problems, to be defined later on. Such problems are usually
treated within the context of game theory. In the simplest form, there are two players,
called leader (L) and follower (F) respectively, each having its own cost function,
JL(uL, uF), JF(uL, uF),
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where uL, uF ∈ R. The leader chooses uL, the follower uF. Each player wants to
choose its own decision variable in such a way as to minimize its own cost function.
Without giving an equilibrium concept, the problem as stated so far is not well de-
fined. Such an equilibrium concept could for instance be one named after Nash or
after Pareto [1]. In the Stackelberg equilibrium concept, one player, the leader, an-
nounces his decision uL, which is subsequently made known to the other player, the
follower. With this knowledge, the follower chooses his uF. Hence, uF becomes a
function of uL, written as
uF = lF(uL),
which is determined through the relation
min
uF
JF(uL, uF) = JF(uL, lF(uL)).
For the sake of simple exposition, it is assumed that this minimum exists and that it
is unique for each possible choice uL of the leader. The function lF(·) is sometimes
called a reaction function (i.e., it indicates how the follower will react upon the leader
decision). Before the leader announces his decision uL, he will realize how the fol-
lower will react and hence the leader will choose and subsequently announce uL so
as to minimize
JL(uL, lF(uL)).
Example 1.1 Suppose that
JL(uL, uF) = (uF − 5)2 + u2L, JF(uL, uF) = u2L + u2F − uLuF.







which results immediately in uL = 2. With this decision of the leader, the follower
will choose uF = 1. The costs for the players are given by respectively 20 and 3.
Another equilibrium concept, to be dealt with now, is the inverse Stackelberg equi-
librium as it was introduced in [2]. The leader does not announce the scalar uL, as
above, but a function γL(·) which maps uF into uL. Examples of games with such
information structure are:
• The leader is the bank and the follower the investor. The investor can buy stocks,
with the bank as intermediator, with the money he has in his savings account.
Suppose he buys stocks worth uF Euros. Then the bank will charge him γL(uF) as
transaction costs. The function γL(·) has been made known by the bank before the
actual transaction takes place [3, 4].
• The leader is a producer of electricity in a liberalizing market and the follower is
the market (a group of clients) itself. The price of electricity is set to γL(uF), where
uF is the amount of electricity traded.
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Given the function γL(·), the follower will make his choice uF according to
u∗F = arg minuF JF(γL(uF), uF). (1)
Optimizing quantities are provided with an asterix. The leader, before announcing
his γL(·), will of course realize how the follower will play and he should exploit this
knowledge in order to choose the best possible γ -function, such that ultimately his
own cost function JL becomes as small as possible. Symbolically, we could write
γ ∗L (·) = arg min
γL(·)
JL(γL(uF(γL(·))), uF(γL(·))). (2)
In this way, one enters the field of composed functions [5], which is known to be a
notoriously complex area.
Example 1.2 In terms of Example 1.1, (1) becomes
u∗F = arg minuF = arg min(γ
2
L (uF) + u2F − γL(uF)uF).
Thus, u∗F has become a function of the yet unknown γL and this function is substituted
into (2) leading to
γ ∗L = arg min((u∗F − 5)2 + γ 2L (u∗F)).
From here onward, it turns out to be difficult to proceed in an analytic way. However,
there is a trick that often works as is exemplified by the following example.
Example 1.3 Suppose that the cost functions are those of Example 1.1. If both the
follower and the leader would be so kind as to minimize JL(uL, uF), the follower
totally disregarding his own cost function, the leader would obtain his team minimum,
i.e. JL(0,5) = 0. Now, the leader should choose the curve uL = γL(uF) in such a way
that the minimum uL = 0, uF = 5 lies on this curve and moreover that this curve does
not have other points in common with the set
JF(uL, uF) = u2L + u2F − uLuF ≤ JF(0,5) = 25.
An example of such a curve is uL = 2uF − 10. With this choice of the leader, the best
for the follower to do is to minimize
JF(2uF − 10, uF),
which leads to uF = 5. Hence uL = 0 and, to our surprise, the leader obtains his
team minimum in spite of the fact that the follower minimizes his own cost function
(however, subject to the constraint uL = γL(uF) = 2uF − 10).
Other examples exist in which the leader cannot obtain his team minimum and such
problems are harder to deal with as exemplified by the following example.
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Example 1.4 This is a continuation of Example 1.3. We add the constraints −4 ≤
uL ≤ +3 and −5 ≤ uF ≤ 7, which the two players must obey. Although the absolute
minimum of the leader cost function is a feasible point in this rectangle, the leader
will not be able to enforce it here. The worst that can happen to the follower is char-
acterized by minuF maxuLJF which is realized for uF = −2, uL = −4 resulting in




s.t. JF(uL, uF) ≤ JF(−4,−2) = 12.
The calculation to find this solution, though straightforward, does not lead to a “nice”
answer. The solution will simply be indicated by u†L(≈ 0.51), u†F(≈ 3.69). An opti-
mal choice for the leader is
uL = γL =
{





F −  ≤ uF ≤ 7,
where  is an arbitrarily small positive number. The quantity  being greater than zero
makes the solution unique;  = 0 would lead to a nonunique response of the follower
(i.e., either uF = −2 or uF = u†F, where the latter is clearly preferred by the leader).
The philosophy in most cases (as in the current paper) is first to get an impression
of what the leader can achieve and subsequently try to find a strategy to really achieve
this goal. If one does not have any clue as to what the leader can achieve (in terms of
minimal costs), hardly anything is known.
The origin of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept goes back to [7]. A steady
stream of publications has appeared since then, see e.g. [2, 6, 8, 9] and the references
therein. Originally applications were found in economics, but nowadays Stackelberg
problems are recognized to be present in many other areas; see e.g. [10–13].
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, a particular inverse
Stackelberg problem will be introduced; it is a game with the bank as leader and
the investor as follower. In Sect. 3, problems with more than one leader and/or
more than one follower are considered. In these problems the leaders, as well as
the followers, will play according to the Nash equilibrium concept among them-
selves. Hardly any theory is available in this area and the contribution is to show,
by means of various examples, what kind of phenomena exist and what kind of
problems occur. The word ‘static’ in the title refers to problems in which there
is no time evolution; there is no underlying model described by a differential or
difference equation. The only dynamics that shows up is that the follower acts
after the leader. For both players, it concerns a one-shot game. In the subse-
quent paper [14], dynamic inverse Stackelberg problems will be considered; time
evolution plays an essential role in the sense that both players act more than
once.
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2 Specific Static Problem
We will consider the following static problem:
min
u
(f (u) + γ (u)), max
γ (·)
γ (u),
subject to γ (·) ≥ 0 and γ (0) = 0. A possible interpretation is an investor who wants
to maximize its wealth −f (u), equivalently, wants to minimize its loss f (u), where
u represents the amount of stocks to buy or to sell. The buying or selling is done
through a bank which wants to maximize its transaction costs γ (u). If there is no
trade (u = 0), the transactions costs are zero (γ (0) = 0). The investor is secured of
a maximum cost f (0) (equivalently: a minimum income −f (0)) by playing u = 0.
Therefore he will only take u-values into consideration for which f (u) ≤ f (0). This
set of u-values is called U .
Example 2.1 As a specific f take f (u) = (u − 1)2 + 1, then U = [0,2]. An upper
bound for the investor’s criterion is f (0) = 2. Suppose that the bank chooses
γ (u) =
{
(f (0) − f (u))(1 − ), if 0 ≤ u ≤ 2,
≥ 0, elsewhere, (3)
where  is a small positive number. Obviously u∗ = 1, the investor criterion is 2 − 
and the bank profit is 1 − . The conclusion is that the bank reaps essentially all the
investor profits (the latter would have been minu f (u) = 1 if the transaction costs
would have been identically zero). Note that the optimal γ -function of the bank is
nonunique; another choice, equally advantageous to the bank, would be
γ (u) =
{
1 − , if u = 0,
0, if u = 0,
where  is a small positive number. If one wants to adhere to the nondecreasing
property of γ , then (3) could be replaced by
γ (u) =
{
(f (0) − f (u))(1 − ), if 0 ≤ u ≤ 1,
1 −  + (1 − u)2, if u ≥ 1,
and for negative u: γ (u) = γ (−u), without altering the results.
Theorem 2.1 An upper bound for the profit of the bank is f (u = 0) − f (u = u∗),
where u∗ is the optimal decision of the investor in absence of transaction costs, i.e.
u∗ = arg minf (u).
The proof is straightforward:
f (u∗) + γ (u) ≤ f (u) + γ (u) ≤ f (0) + γ (0) = f (0),
594 J Optim Theory Appl (2009) 143: 589–600
which leads immediately to γ (u) ≤ f (u = 0) − f (u = u∗). That the leader essen-
tially reaps all profits from the follower is a known phenomenon. In [13], one can
for instance read: “It is a remarkable feature of these problems (i.e., contract design
games) that the leader always takes all, pushing the follower to zero utility”.
3 More Leaders and Followers
This section has been inspired by modelling the price of electricity on a free market
[15]. Only static problems will be considered. The idea is that there are P producers
of electricity which offer their products to M markets. These products are identical
apart from possibly the price. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume P = 2, M =
2. The producers, called P3 and P4, will be the leaders and the markets, P1 and P2,
are the followers. The two leaders among themselves will play Nash, as will the two
followers among themselves. Assume that each of the two followers (i.e. the markets)
chooses an amount of electricity ui ∈ R, i = 1,2, respectively, with no restrictions
concerning bounds for the time being. Their cost functions, to be minimized are Ji ,
i = 1,2. In addition, the two leaders (i.e. the producers) choose ui ∈ R, i = 3,4,
again with no restrictions for the time being. These decision variables are not chosen
as scalars directly, but as functions of ui ∈ R, i = 1,2 (think of ui ∈ R, i = 3,4, as
being prices that depend on the quantities ui ∈ R, i = 1,2, chosen by the followers).
As before, we will write ui = γi(u1, u2), i = 3,4. The cost functions of the leaders,
to be minimized, are Ji , i = 3,4. The direct dependence of the cost functions on the
various decision variables will be as follows:
J1(u3, u4, u1), J2(u3, u4, u2), J3(u3, u1, u2), J4(u4, u1, u2). (4)
The interpretation of J1(u3, u4, u1) for instance is that the value of the criterion is
determined by the total amount of electricity requested and this will depend on the
price setting of the two producers, ui = γi(u1, u2), i = 3,4. In practice, the market
will buy an amount u1i from producer i, with u13 +u14 = u1, so as to get the electric-
ity at the lowest price. The cost function J1 does not directly depend on the amount
of electricity required by the second market. The cost function of the first producer,
i.e. P3, depends on the total amount of electricity sold, i.e. on u1 and u2, its own price
setting, but not directly on the price setting of the other producer.
The dependence of the cost functions on the decision variables as expressed by
(4) is of course not the most general one. However, the restriction to this subclass
of possible cost functions will lead already to novel phenomena and the analysis is
simpler than in the general case.
In the remainder of this section, we will consider two subsections, one with one
leader and two followers, and the other one with one follower and two leaders. No
realistic cost functions are envisaged.
3.1 Special Case: One Leader, Two Followers
Example 3.1 Consider a game with two followers and one leader, specifically,
J1 = u21 − u1u3, J2 = u22 − 2u2u3,
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J3 = u23 + 2u1u3 + 5u2u3 + u21 + u22 + 4u23.
The absolute minimum of J3 is achieved for u1 = −8/25, u2 = −20/25 and u3 =
8/25. Call this point A. This point would be achieved if all players would help mini-
mize J3. The leader will try to obtain his team minimum by choosing the coefficients
αi in
u3 = γ3(u1, u2) = α1u1 + α2u2 + α3
properly. If he is successful with linear functions, there is no necessity to consider
the larger class of nonlinear functions. We derive three (linear) equations for the co-
efficients αi . The first one is obtained by the fact that the absolute minimum must
lie on the curve u3 = α1u1 + α2u2 + α3. The second and third ones are obtained by
∂Ji (ui ,γ3(u1,u2))
∂ui
= 0, i = 1,2. The equations are
−8α1 − 20α2 + 25α3 = 8,
16α1 − 20α2 − 25α3 = 16,
−8α1 + 80α2 − 50α3 = 40,
which results in




Checking the second-order conditions leads to wrong signs of the second order deriv-
atives in the supposed solution (in spite of the fact that each cost function Ji has a
minimum with respect to its “own” decision variable ui ). Hence, the solution ob-
tained cannot be the correct one. If the leader would instead announce the nonlinear
strategy












with constants μ1 > 254 and μ2 >
9
8 , then also the second order conditions are ful-
filled. Thus, a nonlinear strategy for the leader does work in order for him to obtain
his absolute minimum.
We continue with a slightly different problem in order to show that a linear strategy
for the leader sometimes can work. The cost functions are now changed to
J1 = u21 − u1u3 + 2u23,
J2 = u22 − 2u2u3 + 5u23,
J3 = u23 + 2u1u3 + 5u2u3 + u21 + u22 + 4u23.
Note that the only difference is that we have added a u3 term to J1 and J2; J3 has
not been changed. We could perform the same analysis as above to reach the correct
solution this time. We will, however, proceed in a slightly different way to achieve the
(same) solution. The absolute minimum of J3 is still achieved for u1 = −8/25, u2 =
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−20/25 and u3 = 8/25 (i.e. point A). Consider the constant level curve J1(u1, u3)
through this point, i.e. J1(u1, u3) = 928/625. This curve determines u3 as a function
of u1. By taking the total derivative of J1(u1, u3) = 928/625 with respect to u1,
one obtains ∂u3
∂u1
= 35 in point A. By considering the constant level curve J2(u2, u3)
through the same point, one obtains similarly ∂u3
∂u2
= 715 . Hence, if a linear γ3 function
exists, it must be of the form
u3 = γ3(u1, u2) = α1u1 + α2u2 + α3
with α1 = 35 , α2 = 715 . Now, α3 is obtained by the fact that the curve u3 = γ3 must
pass through A. This yields α3 = 332375 .
The γ -function thus obtained satisfies all requirements and the leader obtains his
team minimum with this choice. In other words, he cannot do better.
In the example above, we studied the problem with two followers and one leader.
The analysis introduced can be extended directly to N followers and one leader. The
adagium “divide and conquer” applies in the example above (for the leader). It is
conjectured that this adagium holds generically, at least as long as there are no re-
strictions on the decision variables (compare Examples 1.3 and 1.4). What one has to
find is a function u3 = γ3(u1, u2) such that
u∗3 = γ3(u∗1, u∗2), u∗1 = arg minJ1(u1, γ3(u1, u∗2)), u∗2 = arg minJ2(u2, γ3(u1, u∗2)),
where (u∗1, u∗2, u∗3) is the absolute minimum of J3. It is even conjectured that this
statement holds for cost functions with a more general dependence on the decision
variables as in (4).
In the following example, we will study the problem with two leaders and one
follower. In this case, there is not an obvious point (as the point A above) on which
both leaders will agree at the outset. Hence, we will not start with such a point.
3.2 Special Case: One Follower, Two Leaders
Example 3.2 The follower has the cost function
J1 = u21 + u23 + u24,
and the leaders have the cost functions
J3 = (u1 − 1)2 + (u3 − 1)2, J4 = (u1 − 2)2 + (u4 − 1)2,
respectively. Suppose that the two leaders will choose their functions γi as
u3 = γ3(u1) = α1u1 + α2, u4 = γ4(u1) = β1u1 + β2.
In the three-dimensional (u1, u2, u3) space, these two planes have a line of intersec-
tion and the follower is forced to choose the best point (i.e., with the minimum value
of J1) on this line of intersection. This leads to
u1 = −α1α2 + β1β21 + α21 + β21
.
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Realising this choice of the follower, the two leaders will substitute this choice into
their own γ functions and subsequently into their own cost functions. Thus, these cost
functions become functions of the parameters αi and βi , i = 1,2, only. By setting
∂J3(α1, α2, β1, β2)
∂αi
= 0, ∂J4(α1, α2, β1, β2)
∂βi
= 0,
i.e., the necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium, one obtains four equations with
four unknowns. The solutions have been obtained by means of Maple.1 They are
α1 = −5, α2 = 10, β1 = −2, β2 = 5,
with corresponding u1 = 2, u3 = 0, u4 = 1 and
α1 = −1, α2 = 2, β1 = 2, β2 = −2,
with corresponding u1 = 1, u3 = 1, u4 = 0. Besides, some other solutions were in-
dicated which result from the roots of a fourth order polynomial.
Let us study the first solution given in more detail. It turns out that the second-order
conditions are fulfilled. Hence, a correct solution has been obtained. It is striking
that the resulting u-values coincide with the absolute minimum of the second leader
(moreover, the second solution obtained corresponds to the absolute minimum of the
first leader).
It is claimed now that the solution obtained is only locally optimal. If the second
leader sticks to
u4 = γ4(u1) = −2u1 + 5,
it is claimed now that the first leader can do better than
u3 = γ3(u1) = −5u1 + 10,
namely by playing
u3 = γ3(u1) = +5u1 − 4.
With this choice of γ3, while γ4 remains the same, i.e. γ4(u1) = −2u1 + 5, the first
leader obtains his team minimum (u1 = u3 = 1). How has this latter γ3 function been
obtained? Answer: by substituting the function u4 = γ4(u1) = −2u1 +5 into the cost
functions J1 and J3. This now is a game for one leader and one follower. The leader
can obtain his team minimum in this case.
If the first leader chooses u3 = γ3(u1) = +5u1 − 4, then the second leader might
be willing to change his γ4 function. Indeed, that is the case. With u3 = γ3(u1) =
+5u1 − 4 (fixed) and u4 = γ4(u1) = −32u1 + 65, the resulting (u1, u3, u4) coin-
cides with the absolute minimum of the second leader! If the leaders continue with
1O. Pourtallier (INRIA) is acknowledged for having carried out these calculations.
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alternately adapting their optimal functions, we obtain
u4 = γ4(u1) = −2u1 + 5,
u3 = γ3(u1) = +5u1 − 4,
u4 = γ4(u1) = −32u1 + 65,
u3 = γ3(u1) = +1055u1 − 1054,
u4 = γ4(u1) = −1114082u1 + 2228165,
et cetera. Obviously this algorithm does not converge. In this sequence, if P3 is the
last actor, then his choice of γ3(u1) leads to the absolute minimum of J3. On the other
hand, if P4 is the last actor, then his choice of γ4(u1) leads to the absolute minimum
of J4. By drawing a three-dimensional picture, it will be clear that linear γ -functions
cannot lead to a Nash solution.
In the following theorem, (u1,J3 , u3,J3 ) refers to the pair (u1, u3) that minimizes
J3 (in the example u1 = 1, u3 = 1). Similarly, (u1,J4 , u4,J4 ) refers to the pair (u1, u4)
that minimizes J4 (in the example u1 = 2, u4 = 1).
Theorem 3.1 If u1,J3 = u1,J4 , a Nash solution between the leaders does not exist.
This theorem holds irrespective of the class of γi(u1) functions, i = 3,4, one ad-
mits. If these functions are allowed to be discontinuous (even with an infinite number
of discontinuity points), the theorem remains true.
Proof Given γ4(·), the other player will choose γ3(·) with u3,J3 = γ3(u1,Ji ) in such
a way that J1 reaches its minimal value at the point u1,J3 , u3,J3 , γ4(u1,J3) on the
intersection of the two curves ui = γi(u1), i = 3,4. This choice of γ3(·) leads to a
solution of the game which coincides with the team minimum of J3. On his turn, the
other leader (who chooses γ4(·)) can choose his γ4(·) function in such a way that
the solution of the game coincides with the team minimum of J4. Due to the fact
that u1,J3 = u1,J4 these two solutions obtained (one with γ4 given and finding the
optimal γ3, and the other one with γ3 given and finding the optimal γ4) will never be
consistent. 
Remark 3.1 As long as u1,J3 = u1,J4 , the well-known consequences of “two captains
on a ship” seem to apply. If u1,J3 = u1,J4 , then the Nash solution exists; it leads
to the team minima of both leaders. Essential in the proof above is that there are
no restrictions on the decision variables, e.g. of the kind Li ≤ ui ≤ Ui . With such
restrictions, the problem may become solvable, even if u1,J3 = u1,J4 , as shown in the
following example.
Example 3.3 Let us consider the cost functions of Example 3.2 once more, but now
with the constraints −1 ≤ ui ≤ +3, i = 1,2,3. The roles of the players also remain
the same. We will let the two leaders alternately minimize their cost functions and
see whether this algorithm converges.
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We start by assuming γ3 to be given with u3 = γ3(u1) ≡ 0. A two-player Stack-
elberg game results with P4 as leader and P1 as follower. Their cost functions are
respectively
J1 = u21 + u24, J4 = (u1 − 2)2 + (u4 − 1)2.
An optimal choice for P4 is
u4 = γ4(u1) =
{
3, if u1 = 2,
1, if u1 = 2. (5)
As a result of this choice P1 will choose u1 = 2. Subsequently u4 = 1 and P4 has
realized his team minimum. Note that many other choices for γ3 are possible with
the same result, e.g.
u4 = γ4(u1) =
{
−2u1 + 5, if 1 ≤ u1 ≤ 3,
3, if − 1 ≤ u1 ≤ +1.
We will continue with the first choice for γ4 given, i.e. (5). Keeping this function
fixed, the other leader P3 will now choose his optimal γ3(u1) function. Equation (5)
is substituted into J1 leading to
J1 = u21 + u23 +
{
9, if u1 = 2,
1, if u1 = 2.
It is easily verified now that an optimal solution for P3 is
u3 = γ3(u1) =
{
3, if u1 = 1,
1, if u1 = 1. (6)
This leads to the team minimum of P3. Also in this case, the optimal γ3 is not unique.
We now fix γ3 as given in (6) and study the best answer by P4. P4 cannot obtain
his team minimum anymore, since J1 prefers playing u1 = 1 to u1 = 2, whatever the
choice of γ4(·). The worst that can happen to player P1 is the outcome 11 which is
realized for u1 = 1, u4 = γ4(u1 = 1) = 3, u3 = γ3(u1 = 1) = 1. Hence, P4 should
consider minu1,u4 J4(u1, u4) subject to J1(u1, u3 = γ3(u1), u4) ≤ J1(u1 = 1, u3 =
1, u4 = 3) = 11. This leads to
u4 = γ4(u1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩













as a possible choice for P4. The value 1 > 0 has been added so as to make the choice
for P1 unique after (7) has been announced. For 1 = 0, player P1 has two choices,
but one of them is preferred by P4.
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If we continue in this way, ultimately we find that
γ3(u1) =
{
3, if u1 = 1,
1, if u1 = 1, γ4(u1) =
⎧⎨
⎩









apart from -terms, is a stable Nash solution, which, however, leads to a nonunique
minimum of the follower. Follower chooses either u1 = 1 or u1 =
√
8
5 . The first
choice leads to J ∗1 = 11, J ∗3 = 0, J ∗4 = 5 and the second one to J ∗1 = 11, J ∗3 =
4.07, J ∗4 = 0.69. Follower apparently is rather beneficial to one leader of his choice.
4 Conclusions
The theory of inverse Stackelberg problems is a difficult one, especially if there is
more than one follower and/or more than one leader involved. The surface has been
scratched only. The mathematical difficulty lies in the fact that composed functions
form part of the analysis and the study of such functions is known to be notoriously
complex. This paper showed some phenomena which can show up in the solutions of
simple static inverse Stackelberg problems.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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References
1. Bas¸ar, T., Olsder, G.J.: Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory. SIAM, Philadelphia (1999)
2. Ho, Y.-C., Luh, P.B., Olsder, G.J.: A control-theoretic view on incentives. Automatica 18, 167–179
(1982)
3. Bernhard, P.: A robust control approach to option pricing including transaction costs. In: Nowak, A.
(ed.) Advances in Dynamic Gases. Annals of the ISDG, vol. 7, pp. 391–416. Birkhäuser, Basel (2002)
4. Olsder, G.J.: Differential game-theoretic thoughts on option pricing and transaction costs. Int. Game
Theory Rev. 2, 209–228 (2000)
5. Kuczma, M.: Functional Equations in a Single Variable. Polish Sci., Warsaw (1968)
6. Cruz Jr, J.B., Drakunov, S.V., Sikora, M.A.: Leader-follower strategy via a sliding mode approach.
J. Optim. Theory Optim. 88(2), 267–295 (1996)
7. von Stackelberg, H.: Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Springer, Vienna (1934) (English translation:
The Theory of the Market Economy. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1952))
8. Simaan, M., Cruz Jr., J.B.: On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero sum games. J. Optim. Theory
Optim. 11, 533–555 (1973)
9. Simaan, M., Cruz Jr., J.B.: Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero sum games.
J. Optim. Theory Optim. 11, 613–626 (1973)
10. Epstein, G.S., Hefeker, C.: Lobbying and concessions: comparing Nash to Stackelberg games. Public
Choice 109(1–2), 175–181 (2001)
11. Roughgarden, T.: Stackelberg scheduling strategies. SIAM J. Comput. 33(2), 332–350 (2004)
12. Stan˘ková, K., Olsder, G.J., Bliemer, M.C.J.: Bilevel optimal toll design problem solved by the inverse
Stackelberg games approach. Urban Transp. 12, 871–880 (2006)
13. Selanie, B.: The Economics of Contracts. MIT Press, Cambridge (2000)
14. Olsder, G.J.: Phenomena in inverse Stackelberg games, part 2: Dynamic problems. J. Optim. Theory
Optim. (2009). doi:10.1007/s10957-009-9572-x
15. van Eck, T.: A New Balance for the Energy Sector. Industrielinqs Pers en Platform, Amsterdam
(2007)
